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should be picked out of the ruck for this high command so soon as the control had passed to the Army Board-a promotion impossible in the case of a Chinese-I find the theory, supported by facts and the prophecy of outsiders, that Tieh's power will grow until he is a second Jung-Lu is no lie.
Two years ago T'ich came south to sweep out the treasuries, and we prophesied that his ambition was to be another K'ang-i. Now that bis centralizing policy has embraced the army, the finances, and the education of China, he is more than K'ang-i, and aspires to equal Jung-Lu. Yet he is somewhat different from the latter, who, after the reversal of reforms, made anti-foreignism his first business, anti-Chinese measures being deferred. Tiel-Liang puts these objects in reverse order. So, while Jung-Lu's Boxers' motto was "support the Manchus, exterminate the foreigners,' Tieh-Liang devotes his military and financial power to crushing the Chinese, leaving the repression of foreigners to be its aftermath.
A review of some of his recent glaring acts will make his motives more manifest Tieh-Liang's conduct is generally similar to Jung-Lu's in 1898-1900. Jung-Lu, after reversing reform, put the Manchu Yu-Lu in his former post of Northern Trade Com- missioner, with military and financial power, and on this followed the Boxer calamity of 1900. To-day Tieh-Liang weakens Yuan, and takes away his military power to give to a Manchu, so as to have sure grasp on the Northern forces. Although one cannot yet foresee whether the parallel will be carried further, yet his vigorous anti- Chinese policy is established beyond doubt, and it is by no means impossible that success in this part of his game will be followed by an attempt to engineer another general Boxer movement.
Moreover, his power is vastly beyond Jung-Lu's, whose satellites were ignorant fellows like Prince Tuan and K'ang-i, while Tieh has educated scholars like Ha Hanchang and Liang-Pi behind him, who to cleverness unite a long-settled purpose. Similarly, Jung-La's Boxers were undisciplined and untrained men, while Tien-Liang disposes of veteran troops, highly trained. With such enhanced power, will he not be able to accomplish more than anything Jung-Lu could do?
Tieh's power for evil being thus obvious, the most important subject nowadays is the Court view.
In the Decree of the 20th of the 9th moon, reorganizing the official hierarchy, Boards were to have single Presidents and Vice-Presidents who might be indifferently Manchu or Chinese--a public proof of their Majesties' equal regard for both races. And to purely Manchu posts, such as Thibetan Resident and the Banner Brigade Generals, Chinese have since gradually been appointed. This is a great proof of the Sovereigns' equal regard for Manchus and Chinese, and the sensible are indeed willing to see prejudice melt away among the great and strained relations die away among the commoners. Yet in recent Government appointments there is grave ground for doubt, and if one had nothing but speculation to go on one might say that before, Chinese and Manchus had equal shares, and now, after the above declaration of indifference, Chinese preponderate in the unimportant, Manchus in the important posts. Such doubt is not stilled by an examination of the official staff, e.g., in the Board of Revenue the President and both Vice-Presidents are Manchus-can one wonder at doubt when the finances are entirely given over to Manchus? With the Army Board it is the same--- that is, all the military control is Manchu. In the Board of Education only one Vice-President is Chinese-that is, most of the educational power is Manchu. Still more, of the seven high provincial authorities no less than four are Manchus. These four facts make it difficult to decide whether the declaration of indifference in use of Chinese and Manchu is the Court's real purpose. It is certain enough that there is a policy of centralization, which originated with President Tieh. Added to his present successful advocacy of a Manchu Commander over the four northern brigades, this not only makes one doubt the sincerity of the Decree of the 10th moon, but makes one conscious that the anti-Chinese policy has lately grown stronger, and which leads one to fear that anon anti-foreign acts are quite probable. And so it is that I have felt impelled to set forth the danger of President Tieh's policy.
The editor's portion is that he earnestly hopes the Court will be careful in employing men strongly prejudiced on the Manchu-Chinese question, and will not let them, by once giving vent to their passion, disorder the peace of the whole State and renew the 1900 trouble. If this advice be taken, it will be for the boundless happiness of China.
Ice or Individual
1907
6 May
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